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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-1739 
___________ 
 
RAMI SHALHOUB, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
OFFICER JAMES DEPRETA; RICHARD ZAVINSHY, Chief of Police; 
ROCHELLE PARK POLICE DEPARTMENT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-00368) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 26, 2011 
 
Before:  BARRY, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 21, 2011) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Rami Shalhoub appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary 
 2 
standard of review.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  For the 
reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
Shalhoub filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 
Rochelle Park Police Department (“the Police Department”); James Depreta, a police 
officer; and Richard Zavinshy, the chief of the Police Department.  Shalhoub alleged that 
on January 22, 2007, Officer Depreta stopped him, took him into custody, and seized 
$876 in cash and the Lincoln Town Car that he was driving.  Depreta apparently released 
Shalhoub, but stated that he would surrender the car to only its registered owner.  
Shalhoub then returned to the police station with Firas Al Salibi, who, although not the 
car’s owner, claimed to have the owner’s permission to use it.  However, in the process 
of these negotiations, the police seized Al Salibi’s vehicle, a Chevrolet van.  Inside the 
van was $15,500 in cash that belonged to Shalhoub, which the police also confiscated.  
Shalhoub claims that the defendants have neither returned his $16,376 nor initiated 
forfeiture proceedings.  On January 27, 2007, Shalhoub was arrested and has been in 
custody since that date. 
Shalhoub initially filed his complaint in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania.  A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation 
concluding that (1) the complaint should be dismissed as barred by the two-year statute of 
limitations, and (2) venue lay only in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey.  The case was then transferred to the District of New Jersey for further 
proceedings. 
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On January 31, 2011, the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey entered an order adopting the previously issued report and recommendation and 
dismissing the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.  The Court concluded that in 
New Jersey, § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, and held that 
Shalhoub had failed to file his complaint within two years of his claims’ accrual.  
Nonetheless, the Court “ordered that to the extent the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s claims 
may be cured by way of amendment, Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days in which to file 
such an amended complaint.” 
On March 1, 2011, the Court entered an order dismissing Shalhoub’s complaint 
with prejudice and closing the case.  On the same day, a document that Shalhoub called 
an “amended motion to show cause” arrived in the District Court.  The Court construed 
the document as an amended complaint, but concluded that it had not been filed within 
the 30-day period prescribed by the Court’s previous order, and thus refused to consider 
it.  Shalhoub then filed a timely notice of appeal. 
As an initial matter, we conclude that the District Court should have permitted 
Shalhoub’s amendment.  Contrary to the Court’s calculation, the amendment was in fact 
filed within 30 days of the date that the Court entered its scheduling order.  Nevertheless, 
we find it unnecessary to remand the case, because the District Court’s ruling that 
Shalhoub’s complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations applies with 
equal force to his amended complaint.  See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 
2000) (explaining that “[w]e may affirm the District Court on any grounds supported by 
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the record”).  As the District Court explained, Shalhoub’s § 1983 claims are subject to a 
two-year statute of limitations.  See O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 126-27 
(3d Cir. 2006).  In his amended complaint, Shalhoub alleges that the defendants wrongly 
seized his property on January 22, 2007.  However, he did not file his complaint until 
December 22, 2010 – well outside the limitations period. 
Shalhoub contends that the equitable tolling doctrine renders his claims timely.  
According to Shalhoub, the defendants told him that they would return his property to 
him when he completed his state sentence, and that these misstatements caused him to 
allow the filing deadline to pass.  See, e.g., Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., L.L.P., 
923 A.2d 293, 298 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).  However, his own allegations 
undermine this argument.  See generally Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258-59 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (explaining that dismissal is appropriate under § 1915 when it is “patently 
clear” that tolling argument lacks merit).  The equitable tolling doctrine “requires the 
exercise of reasonable insight and diligence by a person seeking its protection.”  
Villalobos v. Fava, 775 A.2d 700, 708 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).  Shalhoub 
acknowledges that he finished serving his sentence on September 11, 2008.  Had 
Shalhoub proceeded with reasonable diligence, he would have realized soon thereafter 
that the defendants – despite the promises that they had allegedly made – did not intend 
to return his property.  Shalhoub, however, did not inquire as to the status of his property 
until July 2010, and ultimately did not file his complaint until December 22, 2010.  Thus, 
even if we toll the statute of limitations until Shalhoub should have known that the 
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defendants had permanently confiscated his property (on or about September 11, 2008), 
see Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1392 (3d Cir. 1994), his 
complaint is still barred by the two-year statute of limitations.  Shalhoub’s lack of 
diligence in investigating his claims and filing his complaint is fatal to his equitable 
tolling argument.  See Binder, 923 A.2d at 299 (“Equity does not aid one whose 
indifference contributed materially to the injury complained of.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Group, Inc., 460 F.3d 494, 509 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
We thus agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Shalhoub’s action is time-
barred.  We note that Shalhoub has also asserted a state-law negligence claim; we 
understand the District Court’s dismissal of this claim to be without prejudice to 
Shalhoub’s right to assert that claim in state court.  See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 
(3d Cir. 2009).  With this understanding, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  We also deny Shalhoub’s request for the 
appointment of counsel.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993). 
